EU-LDC Network conference 2002
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Improving Global Governance for Development: Issues
and Instruments - 7-10 December, Chiang Mai
Session 2.3 - Misinterpreted governance: anti-dumping
duties - Summary
The speaker presented a paper on anti-dumping measures and how
they hinder the liberalisation/market access goals of the WTO, focusing
on the APEC region. In the Doha Development Round anti-dumping is
put on the agenda again. Figures for the APEC region show that the
decrease in the average APEC tariff rate equals the increase in
the number of anti-dumping cases. Although anti-dumping and other
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were dealt with in the Uruguay Round,
the growing use of these NTBs shows how flawed the system is.
The paper showed the following:
- APEC countries are by far the largest target of anti-dumping
measures (ADMs), but APEC economies have continued to target themselves
in over 50% of their ADM initiations.
- APEC itself initiated less ADMs over the last decade, while
ADMs initiated by other countries increased during this period.
- The rapid increase in ADMs over the last years can be primarily
attributed to those countries that have been in the GATT/WTO system
for a longer period of time.
Regarding governance issues in anti-dumping, two questions are
important: does the process produce alleged evidence, and does the
evidence prove that there was dumping? The speaker shortly discussed
some of the issues relating to determining the act of dumping, determining
the injury as a result of dumping and the procedures in anti-dumping
cases. The question therefore arises whether one can think of a
better and fairer system. The speaker looked at the possibility
of substituting anti-dumping rules with competition law. Arguments
in favour of competition laws, in contrast to anti-dumping rules,
include the following:
- It protects competition and makes no distinction between domestic
and foreign competition;
- Private litigants can also initiate proceedings;
- There is full supervision by courts;
- Evidence of direct causation and substantial lessening of competition
is needed;
- It requires evidence of deliberate attempts to attack competitors
and there must be proof that the initiator is able to recoup the
costs of below-cost pricing.
The discussant looked at the difference between developed and developing
countries in AD cases. Before the WTO agreement, 69 percent of all
AD cases were initiated by developed countries, and after this the
figure decreased to 63 percent. More than two-thirds of these anti-dumping
cases are filed against developing countries. The success rates
of ADMs of the EU and the US are relatively high. On the other hand,
there are now also some big developing countries that initiate anti-dumping
cases, like India and Argentina. China will become a major target
of ADMs in the future. The discussant also mentioned that the process
in anti-dumping cases can be very lengthy, and in some cases, this
has led to the closure of domestic firms before the case was concluded.
The position of least developed countries in the WTO is therefore
clear: they do not want ADMs against them. The special and differential
treatment has not been put in practice so far in the context of
ADMs. Finally, the discussant addressed the use of competition policy
instead of anti-dumping rules. In principle, Bangladesh is very
sympathetic to this idea. There are however some important questions
to be dealt with before this can happen, like how can you build
in flexibility and non-discrimination, how should competition authorities
co-operate, and what to do with cases relating to mergers, vertical
control and the abuse of a dominant position.
The second discussant discussed the issue of AD from an EU perspective.
He noted that AD is not against free trade, but that it is necessary
because the relatively low tariff levels make market segregation
more difficult. The EU is also in favour of competition rules however.
The discussant stressed that the EU does not use ADMs excessively:
it has filed 16 percent of all anti-dumping cases, while its trade
share is 19 percent. In addition, ADM form only a small share of
total tariff revenue. He also noted that the EU does not only look
at interests of business in anti-dumping cases. An analysis on the
effects for the entire community is carried out, including the impact
on consumers.
In the discussion it was noted that measuring the impact of ADMs
as a share of tariff revenue is very imprecise, because it is also
the fear of anti-dumping cases which hinders production and trade.
It was also noted that ADMs initiated by developing countries are
often directed against other LDCs. Participants were cautious about
the use of competition policy instead of anti-dumping policy. It
should be clear what these competition rules look like, what their
effects are, and how developing countries concerns can be taken
into account. Developing countries are very cautious with new agreements
after their experience with the TRIPS agreement.
Session 2.3 - Speakers
Chair: Zdenek Drabek
Speaker: Dean Spinanger (Kiel Institute of World
Economics)
Discussants: Debapriya Bhattacharya (Centre for
Policy Dialogue), Carlos Bermejo-Acosta (EC Delegation Bangkok)
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